Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony by Kim, Chulyoung
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Centralized vs. Decentralized
Institutions for Expert Testimony
Chulyoung Kim
Yonsei University
August 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69618/
MPRA Paper No. 69618, posted 21 February 2016 16:04 UTC
Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions
for Expert Testimony∗
Chulyoung Kim†
Yonsei University
August 2015
Abstract
The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide
expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework,
I show that there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the litigant is willing to consult an
expert even when the judge is reluctant to appoint her own experts due to high costs.
On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a
more accurate decision when using a court-appointed expert’s advice at trial. I show
that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off and, therefore, in
the argument for the reform toward a centralized system for expert witnesses.
Keywords: expert witnesses, decentralized institution, centralized institution, persua-
sion game, evidence distortion.
JEL: C72, K41.
1 Introduction
In the current American legal system, expert witnesses are selected and retained by litigants,
which I call the decentralized institution. Thus, self-interested litigants invest in strong state-
ments for their causes by searching for and retaining favorable expert witnesses. Proponents
of such an institution argue that the competitive nature of the system provides litigants with
∗I am grateful to the referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved this paper. I also
thank participants at various seminars and conferences for their valuable comments. All remaining errors are
mine.
†School of Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea (chulyoung.kim@gmail.com).
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strong incentives to collect and reveal evidence to defend their causes, in which process the
truth is found.1
Opponents of the present system, however, argue that the “battles of the experts” ob-
served in many civil litigations are obstacles to finding the truth. As expert witnesses are
selected by and affiliated with the litigants, there exists inevitable evidence distortion: only
those experts whose opinions align with the litigants’ interests will be heard at trial. Such
opportunistic behavior by the litigants with the help of their hired guns may work to the
detriment of the accuracy of the final verdict, and thereby place the legitimacy of the legal
procedure itself in question. Concerned about the drawbacks, many scholars have long argued
for a more centralized system for expert witnesses, which I call the centralized institution,
thereby allowing judges to appoint neutral experts.2 In particular, there have been numerous
reform proposals suggesting that the court appoint its own experts, thereby enhancing the
inquisitorial component in the American legal system.3 The main task of this paper is to
evaluate such reform proposals, focusing especially on the accuracy of the legal system.4
The main results show that there is a trade-off between the two institutional arrangements.
On the one hand, the litigants are willing to consult an expert even when the court is reluctant
to appoint its own experts due to high costs. More precisely, there exists an interval of
cost parameters such that no expert is utilized in the centralized institution, whereas an
expert is utilized in the decentralized institution when the cost of using expert advice lies
in the interval. This result obtains because the court, as an impartial decision-maker, must
weigh the possibility that “bad news” lead to an incorrect decision because expert advice
provides imperfect information about the truth. Proposition 3 shows the ways in which such
consideration by the court reduces its incentive to utilize expert advice relative to the litigants’
incentives. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice in both institutions,
the trier of fact can make a more accurate decision when using a court-appointed expert’s
advice at trial. As litigants attempt to distort evidence, there exists an information loss
1Posner (1988, 1999) present strong arguments for such decentralized institutions.
2Federal Rule of Evidence 706 states that the court may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.
However, Rule 706 has been infrequently invoked since its enactment because, among other reasons, many
judges have been reluctant to appoint experts out of a concern that doing so will interfere with the adversarial
process (Cecil and Willging, 1994).
3For example, see Runkle (2001), who discusses the structure of the Court Appointed Scientific Experts
program created by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in order to help judges obtain
independent experts. Also see Hillman (2002), Adrogue and Ratliff (2003), and Kaplan (2006), among others.
Based on his experience as Judge Richard Posner’s court-appointed economic expert, Sidak (2013) argues for
court-appointed, neutral economic experts. Many reformers, most famously including Hand (1901), argued
that the appropriate remedy to adversarial bias (combined with inexpert juries) was increased reliance on
court-appointed, nonpartisan experts.
4Although the main body of this paper is presented in a civil-litigation context, the result is not limited
to it. See Section 6.4 for an interpretation of the model in a criminal-litigation context.
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under the decentralized institution. This behavior by litigants increases uncertainty faced
by the trier of fact, leading to a less-accurate decision than in the centralized institution.
Propositions 4 and 5 provide more precise statements.
The main model in this paper is a persuasion game with endogenous information ac-
quisition, which is adapted from Kim (2014a). In that paper, I study two commonly used
forms of legal processes, the adversarial and inquisitorial systems,5 within a persuasion-game
environment, and show the conditions in which one system dominates the other in terms of
accuracy. An important assumption is that both litigants have access to the same source of
information, and therefore they obtain the same piece of evidence if they were successful in
collecting information before a trial occurs. This assumption is crucial to the finding that
only one litigant searches for information in equilibrium. In contrast, the current paper as-
sumes that litigants have access to different information sources because each litigant seeks
advice from an expert who may possess pieces of evidence different from others. The main
results demonstrate that both litigants may consult an expert in equilibrium, depending on
the cost of expert advice. Thus, the competition between the litigants in the pursuit of more
favorable evidence for their own causes is better modeled in the current paper.
In general, economic analysis has been in favor of decentralized systems of evidence col-
lection. The main intuition obtained from various economic models, as demonstrated in an
early contribution by Milgrom and Roberts (1986), is that information possessed by litigants
is eventually revealed to the fact finder because of competition among them: as a piece of ev-
idence detrimental to one party is beneficial to the other, any evidence is eventually revealed
by one of the competing parties. This intuition has been confirmed to be robust (albeit
not free from debate) in a more general environment, and has provided strong support for
the current form of the American legal system.6 Although the extant literature focuses on
communication problems between informed players and an uninformed decision-maker, the
current paper adds one more dimension to the literature by introducing players’ information
acquisition behavior.
5For an important debate on the relative merits of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Posner
(1988, 1999) and Tullock (1975, 1980, 1988). The distinction between the decentralized institution and
the adversarial system (the centralized institution and the inquisitorial system) is subtle. The adversarial
system is a legal system in which the case under dispute is organized and developed by the initiatives of the
interested parties, rather than by an impartial third party. In theory, the adversarial system can coexist with
the centralized institution, relegating to the court only the role of providing the judge with expert witnesses,
which is the current development of the debate regarding the reform of expert law in the United States. The
focus of the current paper is only on the rule governing expert witnesses, rather than on a broader discussion
on the relative merits of the adversarial system over the inquisitorial system.
6Milgrom and Roberts (1986) employ a persuasion-game framework for their analysis. See, among others,
Froeb and Kobayashi (1996), Shin (1998), Demougin and Fluet (2008), and Kim (2014a) for the same line
of research. Also see Froeb and Kobayashi (2001), Parisi (2002), and Emons and Fluet (2009a,b) for related
research.
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Using a principal-agent model, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Palumbo (2001, 2006),
Iossa and Palumbo (2007), Deffains and Demougin (2008), and Kim (2014b) study whether
information can be provided to the fact finder at a lower cost in decentralized systems.
These models also provide strong support for decentralized systems, showing that incentive
constraints are easily satisfied by exploiting competition among agents. Thus, pointing out
another merit of employing decentralized systems, this line of research complements the
persuasion-game approach adopted in the current paper.
The remainder of the current paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model used for subsequent analysis. Section 3 analyzes the decentralized institution, Section
4 investigates the centralized institution, and Section 5 compares the two institutions in
terms of accuracy. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a discussion. Proofs of the propositions
appear in the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a lawsuit in which a plaintiff (henceforth P) contends with a defendant (henceforth
D). Each litigant pleads for his cause, and a judge (henceforth J) must decide whose cause
should prevail at trial. J wants to make a correct decision accurately reflecting the true state
t ∈ {h, l}. When t = h, J obtains a payoff of 1 if she rules in favor of D, and a payoff of
0 otherwise. Similarly, when t = l, J obtains a payoff of 1 if she rules in favor of P, and a
payoff of 0 otherwise. In contrast, each litigant wants to win at trial regardless of t ∈ {h, l}:
a litigant obtains a payoff of 1 if he wins at trial, and a payoff of 0 otherwise. The prior
probability that t = h is denoted by µ = P (t = h).
To assist J with finding the truth, experts may be called to testify at trial.7 An expert is
someone better equipped than laypersons through “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education (Federal Rule of Evidence 702)” to perceive the truth in his specialized domains.
He can tell whether the plaintiff’s illness is due to exposure to specific toxic chemicals from
the workplace, whether the plaintiff underwent erroneous medical treatment in the hospital,
and so forth. Such testimony provided by expert witnesses is valuable, sometimes crucial, in
the fact-finding process, particularly when the dispute involves scientific and technical issues.
As such, experts play an important role in civil litigation. Formally, each expert has access
to a conditionally i.i.d. random variable x with probability8 e ∈ (0, 1), where x takes the
value of either H or L with the conditional probability P (H|h) = P (L|l) = p > 1
2
.
7Gross (1991) notes that experts testified in 86% of civil trials in a sample of California cases between
1985 and 1986.
8Thus, an expert observes the realization of x with probability e and cannot observe it with probability
1− e.
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Note that x = H can be said to be “favorable” evidence for D and “unfavorable” evidence
for P because, as clarified in the main analysis, if J observes x = H, she believes that t = h
is more likely to be the true state and thereby rules in favor of D. Similarly, x = L can be
said to be favorable evidence for P and unfavorable evidence for D. Also note that e can be
thought of as the expert’s quality. If e is close to 1, the expert can be relied upon to provide
valuable evidence for the issue, whereas if e is close to 0, the expert’s ability is questionable
and is unlikely to be able to provide the trier of fact with useful guidance. I assume that
all available experts have the same quality, i.e., they have the same chance of receiving
information upon investigation.9 Another measure of an expert’s quality in the model is p
because as p increases, the evidence collected by an expert becomes more accurate. Note
that an expert’s quality in this sense cannot be lower than the prior probability µ because if
p is smaller than µ, the evidence x is not precise enough to persuade J to change her decision
depending on the realization of x. Thus, I assume µ ∈ (1 − p, p), which guarantees that J’s
decision is responsive to the evidence and helps us avoid uninteresting cases.
In the current American legal system, expert witnesses are selected and retained by lit-
igants, which I call the decentralized institution (henceforth DI). Opponents of the present
system argue for a more centralized system for expertise, which I call the centralized institu-
tion (henceforth CI), thereby allowing judges to appoint neutral experts. The main task of
this paper is to study the strength and weakness of each institution, focusing especially on
accuracy.
Formally, DI is modeled as an incomplete information dynamic game with two stages,
Pretrial Stage and Trial Stage. In Pretrial Stage, by paying a cost c > 0,10 a litigant
i ∈ {P,D} can secretly11 consult (at most) one expert to obtain evidence to present at trial.
If his expert observes the hidden evidence, the litigant obtains xi ∈ {H,L}. A litigant cannot
obtain any evidence if either he does not consult an expert or his expert cannot observe the
hidden evidence.
In Trial Stage, litigants present their evidence to J, and I denote a litigant i’s presentation
by ri. I assume that the evidence is verifiable, so litigants can choose to hide but cannot
falsify the evidence presented to J. Thus, when a litigant obtained xi from his expert, he
either truthfully reveals it, ri = xi, or hides it as an attorney’s work product
12 and remains
9An alternative approach is to assume a pool of heterogeneous experts with a mean quality level e, where
an expert is randomly contacted at the request of the litigants or the court. This approach is similar in sprit
to the proposal by Robertson (2010). The result is the same under both approaches.
10This cost may include the cost of searching for experts, preparing a dossier for them, reviewing their
technical reports, separating relevant pieces of evidence from irrelevant ones, and so forth.
11That is, a litigant’s action is not observable to J and the other litigant.
12Robertson (2010) notes at p.210: “Under the attorney work product doctrine, if a litigant consults
with an expert but does not designate her as a trial witness, then the expert’s opinions are generally not
discoverable by the adversary. (According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4): [A] party may not ...
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silent, ri = φ. If a litigant has no evidence, he remains silent, ri = φ. Thus, when a
litigant remains silent, J cannot ascertain whether the litigant is hiding evidence or simply
uninformed. In such a situation, J forms a Bayesian posterior incorporating her belief about
the litigants’ strategies. Finally, J makes a decision regarding which party wins at trial,
payoffs are realized, and the game ends.
In contrast, CI is modeled as a decision-making problem in which J makes a decision
directly consulting experts for evidence and paying a cost c > 0. To make the two institutions,
CI and DI, comparable, I assume that J can consult at most two experts in CI so that the
maximum number of experts consulted in each institution is 2. I also assume that the cost
of consulting an expert is the same in both institutions.
In the following analysis, I first analyze DI and find the perfect Bayesian equilibrium that
is simply referred to as the equilibrium. I then proceed to the analysis of CI and compare
the results from the two institutions.
3 Decentralized Institution
3.1 Trial Stage
I first analyze the players’ behavior in Trial Stage. It is straightforward to see that the
litigants only reveal favorable evidence (i.e., P never reveals xP = H whereas D never reveals
xD = L) because revealing unfavorable evidence only reduces their chances of winning. Thus,
evidence distortion naturally arises in Trial Stage, and J must account for such incentives of
the litigants when observing the litigants’ presentations.13
In the presence of evidence distortion by the litigants, there are four possible situations:
1. (rP , rD) = (L, φ): P wins
2. (rP , rD) = (φ,H): D wins
3. (rP , rD) = (L,H): J’s decision depends on µ
discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at
trial. But a party may do so ... on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the
party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.)” Gross (1991) also notes at p.1143:
“A party that takes full advantage of these [discovery] rules can “informally consult” with a dozen experts
(a non-discoverable activity), retain the five experts who seem most promising (a generally non-discoverable
activity), and, finally, at the last available date, designate the one of these five whose opinion is most favorable
as an expert witness.”
13This feature is not new to the literature, and many papers examine various models in which evidence
distortion is introduced in one way or another. See Sobel (2013) for a survey on this topic.
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4. (rP , rD) = (φ, φ): J’s decision depends on her belief about the litigants’ behavior.
To be more precise, consider the first situation, in which J observes L from P and D
remains silent. The “low” signal from P alone reduces J’s posterior belief below 1
2
.14 As
D’s silence cannot increase J’s posterior belief,15 it is easy to establish that J rules in favor
of P. The reasoning under the second situation is analogous. In the third situation, both
litigants reveal evidence supporting their own claims. As the signals are conditionally i.i.d.,
these two pieces of evidence nullify each other, inducing J to hold a posterior belief equal to
the prior belief. Thus, D wins if µ ≥ 1
2
, and P wins otherwise. This situation shows why
DI is vulnerable to criticisms such as “war of attrition” or “money contest.”16 By consulting
experts and selectively presenting evidence that is favorable to their causes, the litigants can
provide the trier of fact with the impression that the issue at hand is subject to contestation,
which leaves her equipoised without any change in her assessment regarding the dispute.
In the fourth situation, J receives no “direct” evidence because both litigants remain
silent. However, she could obtain “indirect” evidence from the litigants’ behavior:
(a) First, suppose that J believes that no litigant consulted an expert in Pretrial Stage.
Then, J believes that both litigants are silent because they are simply uninformed, and
therefore J’s posterior belief is equal to the prior belief. Thus, D wins if µ ≥ 1
2
, and P
wins otherwise.
(b) Second, suppose J believes that only one litigant consulted an expert in Pretrial Stage.
It turns out that J forms a posterior belief “against” that litigant. For example, if J
believes that only P consulted an expert, her posterior belief in the no-evidence event
(rP , rD) = (φ, φ), denoted as µ(φ, φ), is given by
µ(φ, φ) =
µqh
µqh + (1− µ)ql
=
µ(ep+ 1− e)
µ(ep+ 1− e) + (1− µ)(e(1− p) + 1− e) (1)
14To be more precise, if J observes x = L her posterior belief becomes (disregarding D’s presentation)
P (t = h|x = L) = µ(1− p)
µ(1− p) + (1− µ)p <
1
2
where the inequality holds because µ ∈ (1− p, p).
15D is silent when he is uninformed or hiding xD = L. In the former case, there should be no change
in J’s posterior belief. In the latter case, J’s posterior belief must fall. As J’s posterior belief is a convex
combination of those two beliefs, the posterior cannot increase following D’s silence.
16In his papers, Tullock criticizes such decentralized legal systems for leading to excessive expenditures
through unnecessary duplication and costly overproduction of misleading information. See Tullock (1975,
1980, 1988).
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> µ
where qt is the probability that P remains silent given t ∈ {h, l}; e.g., given that the
true state is high, P remains silent either because he obtained unfavorable evidence
(xP = H) from his expert (with probability ep) or his expert could not observe the
hidden evidence (with probability 1− e), which gives us qh. If P’s silence is due to his
manipulation, J’s posterior belief must be higher than µ, and if P’s silence is due to no
information, J’s posterior belief must be equal to µ. Thus, J’s posterior belief, which is
a convex combination of the beliefs under the two possibilities, becomes “higher” (i.e.,
“against” P) if she believes that only P consulted an expert. Based on J’s posterior
belief, D wins if µ(φ, φ) ≥ 1
2
, and P wins otherwise.
(c) Third, if J believes that both litigants consulted an expert, her posterior belief is equal
to the prior belief because the indirect evidence from each litigant’s silence nullifies one
another.17 Thus, D wins if µ ≥ 1
2
, and P wins otherwise.
At this point, J’s belief about which litigant has consulted an expert can be arbitrary.
In equilibrium, however, her belief must be consistent with the litigants’ strategies, which
will be clarified in Section 3.3. When no direct evidence is revealed in Trial Stage, D wins if
µ(φ, φ) ≥ 1
2
, and P wins otherwise. I say the burden of proof (henceforth BOP18) is on P if
µ(φ, φ) ≥ 1
2
and on D otherwise.
Definition 1. BOP is said to be on P if µ(φ, φ) ≥ 1
2
and on D otherwise.
Note that if a litigant bears BOP, he knows that he can win only when he presents
favorable evidence in Trial Stage. For example, suppose P bears BOP. If P cannot reveal
xP = L (which implies that P will remain silent), J will eventually observe (rP , rD) = (φ,H)
or (rP , rD) = (φ, φ) in Trial Stage, and both cases lead to D’s winning.
3.2 Pretrial Stage
Using backward induction, I now analyze the litigants’ behavior regarding their decisions to
consult an expert in Pretrial Stage. Throughout the analysis, I assume that BOP falls on P.
17This is because I assume that the experts have the same chance of observing the evidence. If I assume
that the litigants randomly contact an expert from a pool of heterogeneous experts, I obtain the same result.
See Sharif and Swank (2012) for an analysis of heterogeneity among litigants.
18BOP is “one of the slipperiest members of the family of legal terms” (the U.S. Supreme Court, 2011),
and it refers to many doctrinal concepts that overlap but are not fully interchangeable. See Talley (2013) for
a survey of this important topic. In this paper, BOP can be interpreted as the burden of production in the
sense that failure to produce required evidence (e.g., xP = L for P) means losing the case.
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The opposite case in which BOP falls on D easily follows because the result is symmetric,
and therefore its analysis is omitted to save space. The analysis of this section is separated
into two parts, depending on the prior probability: µ ≥ 1
2
and µ < 1
2
.
3.2.1 Prior in favor of D
In this subsection, I assume µ ≥ 1
2
. P’s expected payoff is (remember that BOP is on P)
• 0 if he does not consult an expert, or
• µe(1− p)(1− ep · sD) + (1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p) · sD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗) prob. of P’s winning
−c if he consults an expert
where sD = 1 if D contacts an expert and sD = 0 otherwise.
If P does not consult an expert (leading to rP = φ), it is obvious that he will lose in Trial
Stage because D’s presentation is either rD = H (leading to (rP , rD) = (φ,H)) or rD = φ
(leading to (rP , rD) = (φ, φ)) and P loses in both cases. Thus, P’s expected payoff is 0.
If P consults an expert, it is straightforward to check that P wins in Trial Stage only
under (rP , rD) = (L, φ). In this case, the probability of P’s winning (∗) depends on P’s belief
about D’s action:
(a) If D does not contact an expert (sD = 0), the probability of P’s winning (∗) is given by
µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep = e (µ(1− p) + (1− µ)p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P (xP=L)
where P (xP = L) is the unconditional probability that the hidden information is L.
Because D does not provide any evidence, there are only two possibilities in Trial Stage:
(rP , rD) = (L, φ) or (rP , rD) = (φ, φ). That is, P wins if and only if he can obtain and
reveal xP = L to J, whose probability is given above. This probability gives us P’s
expected payoff as proposed if sD = 0.
(b) If D contacts an expert (sD = 1), the probability of P’s winning (∗) is given by
µ e(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A1)
(1− ep)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A2)
+(1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p)).
Note that P cannot secure his winning by revealing xP = L in Trial Stage because D
can “counteract” P’s evidence by revealing xD = H, in which case J’s posterior belief
is equal to µ ≥ 1
2
and therefore D wins. Thus, if sD = 1, the probability of P’s winning
(∗) is lower than under sD = 0: (A1) is the probability that P obtains xP = L given
9
D  P Consult Not
Consult 1− {µe(1− p)(1− ep) + (1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p))} − c 1− c
µe(1− p)(1− ep) + (1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p))− c 0
Not 1− {µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep} 1
µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep− c 0
Table 1: Payoff Table in Pretrial Stage (BOP on P and µ ≥ 1
2
)
t = h, and (A2) is the probability that D remains silent given t = h. Thus, (A1)× (A2)
is the probability that (rP , rD) = (L, φ) occurs in Trial Stage given t = h. The other
term can be similarly understood. This probability gives us P’s expected payoff as
proposed if sD = 1.
Thus, P consults an expert if and only if the cost of consulting an expert is less than the
net benefit from expert advice:
c ≤ cPP = µe(1− p)(1− ep · sD) + (1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p) · sD) (2)
where (i) the subscript P in the threshold cPP indicates that this is the threshold for P, and
(ii) the superscript P in cPP indicates that BOP is on P. As shown above, D’s counteracting
effort reduces P’s incentive to consult an expert: cPP is larger when sD = 0 than when sD = 1.
Thus, as D becomes more aggressive in consulting an expert, P becomes less aggressive.
As the event of D’s winning is the complement of P’s winning, it is straightforward to
calculate D’s expected payoff as follows:
• 1− {µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep} · sP︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. of D’s winning
if he does not consult an expert, or
• 1− {µe(1− p)(1− ep) + (1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p))} · sP︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. of D’s winning
−c if he consults an expert
where sP = 1 if P contacts an expert and sP = 0 otherwise. Thus, D’s behavior can be also
summarized by an appropriate threshold cPD such that D consults an expert if and only if
c ≤ cPD where the superscript and subscript in cPD have similar meaning as before. Table 1
summarizes the simultaneous game that the litigants play in Pretrial Stage.
Note that D never consults an expert when P does not because cPD = 0 if sP = 0.
This finding shows that D’s motive for consulting an expert is primarily to counteract his
opponent’s evidence when he does not bear BOP. Thus, as P becomes more aggressive in
consulting an expert, D also becomes more aggressive.
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3.2.2 Prior in favor of P
In this subsection, I assume µ < 1
2
. It is routine to check that P’s expected payoff is given
as follows:
• 0 if he does not consult an expert, or
• µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep︸ ︷︷ ︸
= eP (xP=L) = prob. of P’s winning
−c if he consults an expert.
Note that if P obtains and reveals favorable evidence, he always wins in Trial Stage
regardless of D’s action. In contrast to the previous case, D cannot counteract P’s evidence
because P enjoys a favorable prior assessment for his cause: P wins not only under (rP , rD) =
(L, φ), but also under (rP , rD) = (L,H) because J’s posterior belief is equal to µ <
1
2
that
leads to P’s winning. Thus, P consults an expert if and only if
c ≤ cPP = µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep. (3)
It is also straightforward to obtain D’s expected payoff as follows:
• 1− {µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep} · sP︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−eP (xP=L)sP = prob. of D’s winnng
if he does not consult an expert, or
• 1− {µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep} · sP︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−eP (xP=L)sP = prob. of D’s winnng
−c if he consults an expert.
It is clear that D never wants to consult an expert. Note that D’s winning does not
depend on his action but only on P’s: whenever P reveals xP = L, P wins regardless of D’s
presentation (i.e., P wins under (rP , rD) = (L,H) and (rP , rD) = (L, φ)); and whenever P
cannot reveal xP = L, P loses regardless of D’s presentation (i.e., P loses under (rP , rD) =
(φ,H) and (rP , rD) = (φ, φ)).
19 Thus, D rationally chooses not to consult any expert, leaving
the final verdict dependent on P’s choice.
3.3 Equilibrium
Note that the allocation of BOP depends on J’s belief regarding which litigant consulted an
expert. Conversely, when the litigants choose whether to consult an expert, they take BOP
(and therefore J’s belief about their own behavior) as given. In an equilibrium, the BOP
allocation must be consistent with the litigants’ strategies. I now turn to this issue and find
the equilibria in DI.
19Remember that P loses under (rP , rD) = (φ, φ) because I assume that BOP is on P.
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It turns out that there exist two types of equilibria in DI. The first type is called the
P-equilibrium and the second type the D-equilibrium. The P-equilibrium is an equilibrium
in which BOP is on P, whereas BOP falls on D in the D-equilibrium. I present the first main
result in the following proposition. I omit the D-equilibrium result to save space, considering
that it is symmetric.
Proposition 1. There exist c and c¯ such that 0 < c < c¯ and the following is true.
1. If µ ≥ 1
2
, the P-equilibrium always exists, and
• c¯ < c : no litigant consults an expert in the P-equilibrium
• c ∈ (c, c¯] : only P consults an expert in the P-equilibrium
• c ≤ c : both litigants consult an expert in the P-equilibrium
2. If µ < 1
2
,
• c¯ < c : the P-equilibrium does not exist
• c ≤ c¯ : the P-equilibrium, in which only P consults an expert, exists if µ is close
to 1
2
or e is close to 1
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results are intuitive. Consider the first part in which µ ≥ 1
2
. When the cost of
consulting an expert is large, no litigant is willing to incur a cost to consult an expert. In the
P-equilibrium, this implies that J observes no evidence in Trial Stage and, knowing that no
expert was involved in equilibrium, rules in favor of D because her posterior belief is equal
to µ ≥ 1
2
. Although P knows that he will surely lose in Trial Stage, he refrains from using
expert advice because it is not worth the cost.
As c decreases, litigants are willing to consult an expert in equilibrium, and if c is suf-
ficiently small, both litigants consult an expert for information. Note that P has a higher
incentive to use an expert, and therefore only P uses expert advice for the intermediate range
of c. Because BOP is on P, there is no chance for P to win if he does not consult an expert,
whereas D still has a chance to win without using expert advice. Therefore, expert advice
has a larger effect on P’s expected payoff, generating the cost range in which only P consults
an expert.
On the other hand, the existence of the P-equilibrium is not guaranteed under µ < 1
2
, in
which case P enjoys a favorable initial assessment toward his claim. Note that as the analysis
of Pretrial Stage reveals, D has no incentive to consult an expert in this case because J’s
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decision does not depend on D’s presentation in Trial Stage. Thus, either P alone consults
an expert under small c, or no litigants use expert advice under large c.
If c is large, no expert is consulted in equilibrium, and J therefore rules in favor of P
after observing no evidence because µ(φ, φ) = µ < 1
2
. However, such a posterior belief is not
consistent with BOP on P, and therefore the P-equilibrium does not exist in this situation.
If c is small, P consults an expert, which increases J’s equilibrium posterior belief µ(φ, φ)
because J exercises skepticism toward P’s silence in Trial Stage. Thus, if this increase in belief
is sufficiently large, I have µ(φ, φ) ≥ 1
2
, which supports the existence of the P-equilibrium.
Observe that this is possible if µ is large (i.e., µ is close to 1
2
) or e is large (i.e., e is close
to 1). If µ is close to 1
2
, even a small degree of posterior updating will move J’s equilibrium
belief beyond 1
2
. If e is close to 1, P’s silence is likely to have come from manipulation, which
increases J’s equilibrium posterior belief by a large degree.
4 Centralized Institution
In CI, J makes a decision directly consulting experts. Because J directly interacts with ex-
perts, she observes evidence from experts without any information loss arising from evidence
distortion as in DI.20 In the following analysis, I study J’s choice of using expert advice and
her final decision at trial under the assumption that µ ≥ 1
2
. As the analysis for the other case,
µ < 1
2
, is symmetric,21 I omit the result to save space and to avoid unnecessary confusion.
First, suppose that J consults two experts. For comparison with DI, I denote the result
from the first expert’s investigation as rP and that from the second expert’s investigation as
rD. The following are the possible situations:
• (rP , rD) = (H,H): D wins
• (rP , rD) = (H,L) or (L,H): D wins (∵ posterior is equal to µ ≥ 12)
• (rP , rD) = (L,L): P wins
• (rP , rD) = (H,φ) or (φ,H): D wins
• (rP , rD) = (L, φ) or (φ, L): P wins
• (rP , rD) = (φ, φ): D wins (∵ posterior is equal to µ ≥ 12)
20Evidence distortion could arise in CI as well. For this possibility, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1999)
and the extensions of their model, including Palumbo (2001, 2006), Iossa and Palumbo (2007), Deffains and
Demougin (2008), and Kim (2014b), which adopt an incomplete contract framework.
21Proposition 2 presents the result for the case of µ ≥ 12 and is summarized by the thresholds cJ and
c¯J . The result for µ <
1
2 can also be summarized by appropriate thresholds with the same structure as in
Proposition 2.
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In contrast to DI, there is no indirect evidence that can be collected from the no-evidence
event, (φ, φ), because it simply indicates that both experts are uninformed. Thus, J has no
information under the event (φ, φ), and her posterior belief therefore is equal to her prior
belief. Because I assume µ ≥ 1
2
, D wins under such a situation.
Anticipating these results, J’s expected payoff when consulting two experts is
pi2J = P (H,H)µ(H,H) + 2P (H,L)µ+ P (L,L)(1− µ(L,L))︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. payoff from observing both signals
+ 2P (H)µ(H) + 2P (L)(1− µ(L))︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. payoff from observing only one signal
+ (1− e)2µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. payoff from observing no signal
− 2c︸︷︷︸
cost of expert advice
= e2(µp2 + 2p(1− p)µ+ (1− µ)p2) + 2e(1− e)(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)2µ− 2c
P (j, j′) : probability of (rP , rD) = (j, j′) for j, j′ ∈ {H,L}
P (j) : probability of (rP , rD) = (j, φ) for j ∈ {H,L}
µ(j, j′) : posterior from (rP , rD) = (j, j′) for j, j′ ∈ {H,L}
µ(j) : posterior from (rP , rD) = (j, φ) for j ∈ {H,L}
More precisely, consider the first term in J’s expected payoff. The probability to observe
(H,H) is
P (H,H) = e2(µp2 + (1− µ)(1− p)2).
Given that the hidden evidence is (H,H), J believes that the probability of t = h is
µ(H,H) =
µp2
µp2 + (1− µ)(1− p)2 >
1
2
.
Thus, J rules in favor of D, expecting to obtain
µ(H,H)× 1 + (1− µ(H,H))× 0
which is equal to µ(H,H). Multiplying P (H,H) and µ(H,H) provides us with the first term
e2µp2. Other terms can be similarly understood.
Second, suppose that J consults only one expert.22 The following are the possible situa-
tions:
22I denote the information from this expert as rP without loss of generality.
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• rP = H: D wins
• rP = L: P wins
• rP = φ: D wins (∵ posterior is equal to µ ≥ 12)
Anticipating these results, J’s expected payoff from consulting only one expert is
pi1J = P (H)µ(H) + P (L)(1− µ(L))︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. payoff from observing one signal
+ (1− e)µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. payoff from observing no signal
− c︸︷︷︸
cost of expert advice
= e(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)µ− c
where P (j) and µ(j) for j ∈ {H,L} are as defined previously.
Finally, if J consults no experts, she simply rules in favor of D according to her prior
belief, and therefore her expected payoff is given by
pi0J = µ.
By comparing these expected payoffs, I can identify the conditions under which J consults
two, only one, or no experts, which is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There exist cJ > 0, c¯J > 0, and µ ∈ (12 , p) such that the following is true.
1. When µ ∈ [1
2
, µ), the optimal number of experts for J is
• 0 if c¯J < c
• 1 if c ∈ (cJ , c¯J ] 6= ∅
• 2 if c ≤ cJ
2. When µ ≥ µ, the optimal number of experts for J is
• 0 if 1
2
(cJ + c¯J) < c
• 2 if c ≤ 1
2
(cJ + c¯J)
Proof. See the Appendix.
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The first part of the proposition presents an intuitive result: as information from experts
is valuable, a lower cost induces J to consult more experts. In particular, if the cost lies
in the intermediate range, J consults only one expert for information. On the other hand,
the second part demonstrates that it is never optimal for J to consult only one expert under
certain situations. The intuition is straightforward: if J’s prior belief is sufficiently strong,
information from only one expert is not persuasive enough, and J therefore wants to hear
from at least two experts if she chooses to consult any expert.
5 Comparison
In this section, I compare the two institutional arrangements for expert testimony and es-
tablish two main results. First, I show that the cost threshold for no-expert is higher in DI
than in CI. In other words, the litigants consult an expert in DI even when J is reluctant to
do so in CI when the cost of consulting an expert is relatively high. This finding supports
the claim by Posner (1988), who argues that one of the merits of using the decentralized
procedure is the high initiative of the litigants in shaping the fact-finding process. Second,
I show that, given the same number of experts consulted under both institutions, the final
decision by J is more accurate in CI than in DI. This finding highlights the concerns echoed
by Tullock (1988), who criticizes decentralized legal systems for production and presentation
of misleading information by the litigants, to the detriment of the final verdict’s accuracy.
5.1 Incentive to Consult Experts
The following proposition demonstrates that the no-expert threshold is higher under both
types of equilibria of DI than under CI.
Proposition 3. The no-expert threshold from the P-equilibrium in DI is higher than the
thresholds in CI: max{cJ , c¯J} < c¯. The same result holds for the D-equilibrium in DI and
CI.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the intuition, supposing µ ≥ 1
2
, it is instructive to compare the net benefit
from consulting one expert rather than none under both institutions. In CI, J’s net benefit
from consulting one expert rather than none is given by23
e((1− µ)p− µ(1− p)). (4)
23In the proof of Proposition 2, J’s net benefit from consulting one expert rather than none is given by
c¯J . After rearranging terms, c¯J can be expressed as (4).
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The first term inside the parentheses, (1− µ)p, is the probability of observing the low signal
when the true state is low. Because J rules in favor of P upon observing the low signal,
this is “good news” leading to correct decision-making. However, the second term inside
the parentheses, µ(1− p), indicates “bad news” leading to an incorrect decision: this is the
probability of observing the low signal when the true state is high. Because the low signal
induces J to rule in favor of P, it generates errors, which reduces J’s incentive to consult an
expert.
In contrast, in DI, finding the low signal is always good news for P, whose net benefit
from consulting an expert is given by24
e((1− µ)p+ µ(1− p)). (5)
As is obvious from the expression above, finding the low signal is always good news for P,
because the low signal is favorable to his cause and he wants to win regardless of the true
state. This effect increases a litigant’s incentive to consult an expert relative to J’s, and
therefore an expert operates under a larger range of the cost parameter in DI than in CI.
The discussion above suggests that a litigant, who is a partisan agent, has a higher
incentive to consult an expert than a trier of fact, who is an impartial agent. Related results
are reported in the literature. In a setting with heterogenous prior beliefs, Che and Kartik
(2009) show that an agent whose prior belief is different from the decision-maker’s has a
stronger incentive to search for information, which induces the decision-maker to optimally
hire such an agent despite communication problems. Whereas their model demonstrates that
the decision-maker always prefers a partisan agent to a neutral one, my model identifies the
conditions under which using a partisan agent (i.e., using DI) is better than using a neutral
agent (i.e., using CI), and vice versa.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) ask related questions in a principal-agent setting in which
an uninformed principal acquires information through agents before making a decision. Their
main results show that using two agents (termed advocacy), each collecting information for a
competing cause, generates information with lower agency costs than having one agent collect
information for both competing causes (termed nonpartisanship). As the agents are rewarded
based on the principal’s final decision in their model (termed decision-based rewards), the
agent in charge of conflicting tasks is reluctant to provide information for both causes because
if he does so, the two units of conflicting information will lead to the status quo, generating
no payment to the agent. The principal does not have such a problem if she hires two
agents and makes each agent a “partisan” to a cause, which generates the value of using a
24In the proof of Proposition 1, P’s net benefit from consulting an expert is given by c¯. After rearranging
terms, c¯ can be expressed as (5).
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partisan agent in their model. Note that the agent under the nonpartisanship in their model
is not impartial in the sense that he wants to move the principal’s decision away from the
status quo. Thus, their main result is about a comparison between two different types of
partisan preferences of the agents induced by the decision-based rewards, whereas Proposition
3 involves a comparison of the partisan and impartial preferences of the agents.
In contrast to these findings, Dur and Swank (2005) demonstrate that the bias of the
agent may discourage his search effort in a soft-information framework. This is because
when an agent recommends a policy to the decision-maker, a strongly biased agent makes
a recommendation following his bias, not his information. Thus, as the bias of the agent
increases, he values information less and therefore puts less effort in information collection.
Note that they obtain this result because an agent’s recommendation can be different from
his information, which is possible under a soft-information framework. This finding suggests
that the nature of information (i.e., hard versus soft) is an important factor in studying
an agent’s incentive for information search. For a general discussion regarding information
search incentives, see Sobel (2013).
In general, a growing body of literature investigates the trade-off between the collection
and communication of information. On the one hand, for better communication between an
informed agent and an uninformed decision-maker, it is necessary to reduce the degree of
conflict of interest between them. On the other hand, it is often observed that non-congruent
preferences create incentives for agents to exert more effort for information. The current
paper is in line with the extant literature in that it shows that a partisan agent has a higher
incentive to consult an expert than an impartial agent, because the partisan agent’s net
benefit from additional information is higher.
5.2 Information Loss from Evidence Distortion
Both legal institutions, DI and CI, generate errors because J faces uncertainty in decision-
making. To examine which system is better at reducing mistakes, I formally define the
measure of accuracy as follows:
E = µα + (1− µ)β (6)
where α = P (P wins|t = h) is the probability that P wins despite t = h, and β =
P (D wins|t = l) is the probability that D wins despite t = l. Note that D’s winning under
t = l and P’s winning under t = h are clearly incorrect decisions. In particular, considering
t = h as the “null hypothesis” and t = l as the “alternative hypothesis,” α and β can be
interpreted as Type I and Type II errors, respectively. With such an interpretation, the mea-
sure in (6) is the average of the two types of errors. In the subsequent analysis, I calculate
18
E from each legal institution and compare them.
Consider the cost range in which only one expert is consulted in both institutions. First,
suppose µ ≥ 1
2
. Then, the error from the P-equilibrium in DI is calculated as25
E1P = µα + (1− µ)β
= µP (P wins|h) + (1− µ)P (D wins|l)
= µeP (L|h) + (1− µ)(1− e+ eP (H|l))
= µe(1− p) + (1− µ)(1− e+ e(1− p))
More precisely, α is the probability that J incorrectly rules in favor of P. Note that only
P consults an expert, and he wins if and only if he can present favorable evidence for his
cause to J. Given t = h, such an event occurs with probability eP (L|h), which is α in DI.
Similarly, given t = l, D wins if and only if P cannot present favorable evidence to J. Thus,
the probability for such an event is equal to 1− e+ eP (H|l), which is β in DI.
The error in CI is given by
E1J = µα + (1− µ)β
= µP (P wins|h) + (1− µ)P (D wins|l)
= µeP (L|h) + (1− µ)(1− e+ eP (H|l))
= µe(1− p) + (1− µ)(1− e+ e(1− p)).
By consulting only one expert, J observes H, L, or φ as a result of the expert’s investiga-
tion. Note that D wins under φ because there is no evidence distortion in CI and therefore
J’s posterior belief under φ is equal to µ ≥ 1
2
. Thus, P wins if and only if J observes x = L
from the expert, which implies α = eP (L|h) and β = (1− e+ eP (H|l)).
It is interesting to find that the two institutions generate the same amount of mistakes,
i.e., E1P = E
1
J . The intuition is as follows. In DI, P distorts evidence submitted to J by
suppressing unfavorable evidence for his cause. Thus, J only observes the low signal (rP = L)
or nothing (rP = φ) from P. If J observes the low signal, she “correctly”—in the sense that
her decision is based on all the available evidence—rules in favor of P. If P remains silent,
J reasons that there are two possibilities. First, if P is silent due to a manipulation motive
(i.e., hiding xP = H), the correct ruling should be to rule in favor of D. Second, if P is silent
simply because he is uninformed, J’s posterior belief must be equal to µ ≥ 1
2
, and therefore
the correct ruling should be again to rule in favor of D. Thus, in any case, the optimal decision
for J under the no-evidence event is to rule in favor of D, which is exactly what J does in
25The subscript P in E1P clarifies that this is the error from the P-equilibrium in DI.
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the P-equilibrium of DI. This finding demonstrates that evidence distortion is not necessarily
detrimental for the decision-making authority, at least when the decision is binary.
Second, suppose µ < 1
2
. If the P-equilibrium with P consulting an expert exists, its error
takes the same formula as previously calculated. In contrast, the error in CI is given by
E1J = µα + (1− µ)β
= µP (P wins|h) + (1− µ)P (D wins|l)
= µ(eP (L|h) + 1− e) + (1− µ)eP (H|l)
= µ(e(1− p) + 1− e) + (1− µ)e(1− p).
When the prior belief is against D, the no-evidence event induces J to rule in favor of P. Thus,
P wins unless J observes the high signal from the expert, which implies α = eP (L|h) + 1− e
and β = eP (H|l). Since it immediately follows that E1J is smaller than E1P in this case, I
obtain the following proposition.26
Proposition 4. Suppose that only one expert is consulted in both institutions.
1. µ ≥ 1
2
: E1P = E
1
J , and E
1
D > E
1
J if the D-equilibrium exists.
2. µ < 1
2
: E1D = E
1
J , and E
1
P > E
1
J if the P-equilibrium exists.
Although evidence distortion in the P-equilibrium of DI is not detrimental to the decision-
making authority when µ ≥ 1
2
, it is when µ < 1
2
. If P remains silent in Trial Stage of DI, the
P-equilibrium requires J to rule in favor of D. This decision is incorrect if P is silent due to
lack of evidence, because in that case J’s posterior should be equal to µ < 1
2
, leading to P’s
winning. Thus, the impartiality of CI works to reduce decision-making errors relative to DI
in such a situation.
Now consider the cost range in which two experts are consulted in both institutions. For
the P-equilibrium (the D-equilibrium), this is possible only when µ ≥ 1
2
(µ < 1
2
). Let E2P
(E2D) and E
2
J denote the errors from the P-equilibrium (the D-equilibrium) in DI and CI,
respectively. It turns out that when two experts are consulted in both systems, the decision-
making error is always strictly smaller under CI because there is no evidence distortion in
the system. To see this more clearly, consider the situations in which there is no direct
evidence in the P-equilibrium. The event (rD, rP ) = (φ, φ) occurs under the following four
possibilities: (xD, xP ) = (L,H), (φ,H), (L, φ), or (φ, φ). For example, the “correct” decision
under (xD, xP ) = (L, φ) is to rule in favor of P. However, J is induced to rule in favor of D
in such a situation because the litigants present (rD, rP ) = (φ, φ), under which D wins in the
26As the analysis for the D-equilibrium part is symmetric, I present the result without the proof.
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P-equilibrium. Thus, J cannot optimally make use of the available evidence because of the
litigants’ evidence distortion, which increases the error under DI.
Proposition 5. Suppose that two experts are consulted in both institutions. If µ ≥ 1
2
, E2P >
E2J . If µ <
1
2
, E2D > E
2
J .
Proof. See the Appendix.
These results suggest that the benefit of DI lies in the interested parties’ high initiatives,
which induce litigants to use expert information for a larger range of the cost parameter
than J does in CI. However, the implicit cost of DI, other than the cost of experts, is an
information loss due to evidence distortion by the litigants. If the same number of experts is
consulted in both institutions, DI generates more mistakes than CI due to evidence distortion
by the litigants.
6 Discussion
Within the framework of a persuasion game with endogenous information, this paper exam-
ines the relative merits of two institutions, CI and DI. The main results demonstrate that
there is a trade-off: although DI supplies the fact finder with valuable information more
often, it also suffers from an information loss due to its competitive nature.
The analysis suggests that the ranking of the two institutions in terms of accuracy depends
on the cost of consulting an expert. If the cost is large, the decision-making accuracy is
expected to be higher in DI than in CI because expert information is utilized only in the
former institution. In contrast, CI is expected to be superior when the cost is small: if
the same amount of expert information is utilized in the two systems, the decision-making
accuracy is expected to be higher in CI because there is no information loss in the system.
Although proponents for policy reforms who encourage the trier of fact to appoint her
own experts raise valid concerns, one should keep in mind that the cost of using expertise
may affect the system’s performance. If it is costly to make use of the knowledge possessed by
experts in specific domains, society may observe a decline in the usage of expert information
in trial courts as a result of policy reforms, which could lead to less-accurate decision-making
by judges. I conclude this paper by discussing the model’s results and suggesting directions
for future research.
6.1 Continuous Decision
The binary decision assumption is crucial in simplifying the analysis. If J’s decision becomes
continuous in DI, an immediate challenge is that checking the consistency of beliefs becomes
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a daunting task. To describe this point, let us suppose that J’s optimal decision d∗ under
(rP , rD) is equal to her posterior belief.
27 Then, the following are the four possible situations
in Trial Stage:
1. (rP , rD) = (L, φ): d
∗ = µ(L, φ)
2. (rP , rD) = (φ,H): d
∗ = µ(φ,H)
3. (rP , rD) = (L,H): d
∗ = µ
4. (rP , rD) = (φ, φ): d
∗ = µ(φ, φ)
Compared to the basic model, there are two main changes in this extended formulation:
(i) the magnitude of J’s posterior belief becomes more important, and (ii) J’s belief about
the litigants’ behavior in Pretrial Stage becomes more important. For example, consider the
first situation, in which J observes (rP , rD) = (L, φ). In the basic model, J rules in favor of
P, and her decision does not depend on the magnitude of her posterior belief. In contrast, in
this extended formulation, J’s decision crucially depends on the strength of her belief about
the true state: if J strongly believes that the true state is in favor of P’s claim, her decision
becomes more favorable toward P. Furthermore, in contrast to the basic model, J’s decision
depends on J’s belief about the litigants’ behavior in Pretrial Stage: d∗ can be high or low
depending on whether D also consulted an expert in Pretrial Stage. This second effect was
present only in the fourth situation in the basic model, but it operates in other situations as
well in this extended formulation. I leave a more careful analysis of this extended model to
future research.
6.2 Soft Information
Another important assumption in the current model is that information is hard. Thus,
the litigants in DI may conceal evidence if it is harmful to their causes but cannot falsify
the evidence presented to J. Although models with hard information seem reasonable in a
trial setting in which the falsification of evidence imposes large penalties upon the party, an
interesting research area is to study the ways in which the possibility of falsification may
affect the litigants’ strategies along with the trial outcome. For example, see Emons and
Fluet (2009a,b), who study a litigation game in which players may falsify their information
by paying some cost.
The current model is not well-suited to study the effect of soft information, because if
information is soft, a litigant has no incentive to consult an expert: a litigant always wants
27That is, I assume that J’s objective function takes the form of the quadratic function −(d− t)2, where
d ∈ R is J’s decision and t ∈ {0, 1} is the true state.
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to present favorable information to J in Trial Stage because he wants to win regardless
of the true state, and therefore he does not need to consult an expert in Pretrial Stage. In
order to provide a litigant with an incentive to seek expert advice within the soft-information
framework, the model may need to be extended in a way that the litigant’s preference depends
on the true state.28 In such a situation, the litigant wants to obtain knowledge about the true
state before presenting any soft information to J, which generates the value of consulting an
expert.
It is not clear whether the main results still hold in this soft-information framework. In
particular, as discussed in Section 5.1 in light of the work by Dur and Swank (2005), it is
possible that a litigant’s strong preference bias discourages his incentive to consult an expert.
If it is so, the degree of verifiability of evidence at trial will be an important factor in the
trade-off between the two institutions. A careful analysis of this issue awaits future research.
6.3 Cost and Deterrence
The focus of the main results in comparing the two institutions is the accuracy of J’s decision.
However, there are at least two other important characteristics of legal institutions: cost and
deterrence.
First, let us consider the cost effect in comparing the institutions.29 Proposition 3 suggests
that for the high-cost range, DI is likely to be superior to CI in terms of accuracy because
expert advice is utilized only in the former institution. As more expert advice means more
information for J’s decision-making, leading to higher accuracy, DI is expected to perform
better than CI as far as accuracy is concerned. However, as more information from expert
advice can be obtained only by spending more resources for consulting an expert, the litigants’
strong incentive to obtain information is not necessarily beneficial for society. In light of this
trade-off between accuracy and cost, the societal preference over legal outcomes becomes
important: if a society attaches more value to accuracy, it may prefer DI to CI, and vice
versa.30 In contrast, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that we need not be concerned about
28For example, a litigant may ask for a high decision when the true state is moderate, whereas he may
ask for a moderate decision when the true state is low. Such preferences may arise due to a litigant’s moral
concerns, which keep him from deviating too much from the true state.
29Posner argues that accuracy and cost are the two most important criteria in comparing legal systems
(Posner, 1999, p.1542).
30Thus, the existence of different legal institutions may reflect preference differences across societies.
Kaplow (1994) notes that “[one] might go so far as to say that a large portion of the rules of civil, criminal,
and administrative procedure and rules of evidence involve an effort to strike a balance between accuracy and
legal costs.” Presumably, in pursuit of such a balance, certain societies might have embraced a decentralized
way of solving information provision problems, whereas others have adopted a centralized system. Thus, the
current form of legal institutions in a society could be indicative of the preference of the society. In this vein,
Demougin and Fluet (2005) conclude, studying the variation in the standard of proof across societies, that
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such a trade-off for the low-cost range. As expert advice is expected to be utilized in both
institutions, the evidence distortion problem in DI decreases the system’s accuracy relative
to CI in which such a problem does not exist. Thus, if the same amount of expert advice is
used in both institutions, CI is superior to DI regardless of the cost consideration because
a higher level of accuracy can be achieved in CI at the same amount of cost as in DI. This
discussion suggests that the cost consideration operates in favor of CI in the current model.
A related issue is the effect of the rule that requires the litigants, rather than J, to pay
the cost in CI. The main results do not change under this rule if J takes into account the
cost borne by the litigants. If J does not consider the costs of expert advice, she will always
consult two experts in CI regardless of the cost parameter, because expert advice is free
information for J. This change could increase the accuracy of J’s final decision at the expense
of higher costs borne by the litigants, exhibiting the trade-off discussed above.
Second, let us consider how the two institutions perform differently in terms of deter-
rence. Deterrence is intimately related to accuracy because the trial outcomes influence an
individual’s choice of the primary behavior. Following Kaplow (1994), who argues that one
benefit of accuracy is its deterrence effect, one could argue for a positive association be-
tween accuracy and deterrence: a higher level of accuracy is associated with a higher level
of deterrence. Then, DI is expected to increase deterrence relative to CI for the high-cost
range (Proposition 3), whereas CI is more likely to perform better in terms of deterrence
for the low-cost range (Propositions 4 and 5). However, there is also a possibility of tension
in pursuing these two legal outcomes simultaneously. For example, in a series of influential
articles, Demougin and Fluet (2005, 2006, 2008) demonstrate that the common-law rules of
proof maximizes deterrence at the expense of accuracy. Investigating the trade-off among
different legal outcomes will be a fruitful future research topic.
6.4 Criminal vs. Civil Cases
In the main results, I assume that society is equally averse to both types of errors made
by J. In criminal cases, however, society is typically more averse to Type I errors, wrongly
convicting the innocent, than to Type II errors, wrongly acquitting the guilty. Thus, in
general, the measure of accuracy can be defined as
E = µλα + (1− µ)β
common-law countries are more concerned with deterrence than accuracy whereas civil-law countries attach
a greater weight to accuracy.
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where λ > 0 measures the relative weight of Type I errors. In this extended formulation,
criminal cases can be identified with λ > 1.
To understand how this change may affect the main results, consider E1P and E
1
J . If
µ ≥ 1
2
, I still have E1P = E
1
J because Type I errors (and Type II errors as well) under both
institutions are the same. However, if µ < 1
2
(assuming the existence of the P-equilibrium in
DI):
E1P = µλ e(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type I
+(1− µ)(1− e︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+e(1− p))
E1J = µλ (e(1− p) + 1− e︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type I
+(1− µ)e(1− p)
where Type I errors are larger in CI. Thus, if society is sufficiently verse to Type I errors
(i.e., λ is large), I obtain E1P < E
1
J in contrast to the previous result.
This result follows from different BOP allocations across legal institutions. In the P-
equilibrium of DI, P loses when his expert has no evidence (with probability 1 − e in (A))
because he has BOP. In contrast, in CI, it is D who loses when J’s expert fails to obtain
hard evidence (with probability 1 − e in (B)). Thus, the “implicit” BOP falls on D in CI,
although no litigant explicitly bears BOP because J directly interacts with experts.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists of two steps. First, taking J’s equilibrium belief as given, I find the players’
equilibrium strategies. Second, I verify whether J’s equilibrium belief is indeed consistent
with the players’ equilibrium strategies found in the first step. As the proof builds on the
analysis from 3.1 and 3.2, I reproduce the main results of those subsections here as lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Section 3.1). In Trial Stage, the following is each player’s behavior:
1. P only reports xP = L whenever possible
2. D only reports xD = H whenever possible
3. J’s decision is given by
• (rP , rD) = (L, φ) : P wins
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• (rP , rD) = (φ,H) : D wins
• (rP , rD) = (L,H) : D wins if and only if µ ≥ 12
• (rP , rD) = (φ, φ) : D wins if and only if µ(φ, φ) ≥ 12
Lemma 2 (Section 3.2). Assume BOP falls on P. In Pretrial Stage, the following is each
player’s behavior:
1. If µ ≥ 1
2
, there exists a pair (cPP , c
P
D) such that
• P consults an expert if and only if c ≤ cPP , and
• D consults an expert if and only if c ≤ cPD
where (i) cPP and c
P
D depend on the litigants’ choices, and (ii) c
P
D = 0 when P does not
consult an expert.
2. If µ < 1
2
, D does not consult an expert, and there exists cPP such that P consults an
expert if and only if c ≤ cPP .
7.1.1 Step 1: Litigants’ Equilibrium Strategies in Pretrial Stage
When BOP is on P, Lemma 2 demonstrates that three cases are possible: no litigants consult
experts, P alone consults an expert, or both consult experts. In particular, D is never willing
to consult an expert alone. The number of consulted experts under BOP on P depends on
parameter values. To simplify the notations, let us define the following quantities:
c1 = µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep
c2 = µe(1− p) + (1− µ)ep− {µe(1− p)(1− ep) + (1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p))}
c3 = µe(1− p)(1− ep) + (1− µ)ep(1− e(1− p))
where (considering µ ≥ 1
2
for interpretation31)
• c1 is P’s net benefit from expert advice when D does not consult an expert,
• c2 is D’s net benefit from expert advice when P consults an expert, and
• c3 is P’s net benefit from expert advice when D consults an expert.
Having defined these quantities, I can rank them according to their magnitudes. It is
easy to show max{c2, c3} < c1. The following lemma shows c2 < c3:
31When µ < 12 , P’s net benefit from expert advice is c1 regardless of D’s choice, and D’s net benefit from
expert advice is 0 regardless of P’s choice.
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Lemma 3. c2 < c3.
Proof. Rearranging terms, I obtain
c2 < c3 ⇐⇒ e < µ− 2µp+ p
2p(1− p) ≡ eˆ.
Observe that eˆ is positive. The denominator of eˆ is positive because p ∈ (1
2
, 1). The
numerator of eˆ is also positive because
0 ≤ (√µ−√p)2 = µ− 2√µp+ p < µ− 2µp+ p
where the last inequality holds because µp is a fraction.
To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show eˆ > 1. To this end, let us define g(p) as
g(p) = µ− 2µp+ p︸ ︷︷ ︸
numerator of eˆ
− 2p(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
denominator of eˆ
= 2p2 − 2µp− p+ µ.
This function is an increasing function for p ∈ (1
2
, 1) because
g′(p) = 4p− 2µ− 1
> 4p− 2p− 1
= 2p− 1
> 0
where the second line follows because µ < p and the last inequality follows because p > 1
2
.
As g(1
2
) = 0, I conclude that g(p) > 0 for p ∈ (1
2
, 1). This completes the proof.
The litigants’ behavior in Pretrial Stage depends on the size of the cost of using an expert.
Assume µ ≥ 1
2
. If c > c1, even when D does not use an expert, P’s net benefit from using an
expert is less than the cost. Thus, no litigant consults experts for information. If c ∈ (c2, c1],
it is straightforward to show that only P consults an expert. If c ≤ c2, both litigants consult
an expert: D is willing to consult an expert when P consults an expert; because c ≤ c2 < c3,
the cost also rationalizes P’s choice of consulting an expert. Thus, both litigants consult an
expert when c ≤ c2.
Now assume µ < 1
2
. In this case, D is never willing to consult an expert. Therefore, the
only litigant who may consult an expert is P, and his choice depends on whether the net
benefit of consulting an expert is larger than the cost of doing so. Thus, if c ≤ c1, P consults
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an expert, and does not do so otherwise. The following lemma summarizes these findings.
Lemma 4. Suppose that BOP is on P in equilibrium. Then, the following are the litigants’
equilibrium strategies in Pretrial Stage. If µ ≥ 1
2
,
• c1 < c: no litigants consult an expert
• c ∈ (c2, c1]: only P consults an expert
• c ≤ c2: both litigants consult an expert
If µ < 1
2
,
• c1 < c: no litigants consult an expert
• c ≤ c1: only P consults an expert
7.1.2 Step 2: Verifying Consistency of J’s Equilibrium Belief
In the following, I examine whether the litigants’ equilibrium strategies from Lemma 4 are
consistent with BOP on P. As before, I separate the analysis into two parts, µ ≥ 1
2
and µ < 1
2
.
I begin with the first part.
Prior in favor of D
Assume µ ≥ 1
2
. It turns out that any number of expert consulted by the litigants is consistent
with the P-equilibrium, and therefore the P-equilibrium always exists:
1. If none or both of the litigants consult an expert for evidence, I have µ(φ, φ) = µ ≥ 1
2
,
which is consistent with BOP on P.
2. If only P consults an expert, I have µ(φ, φ) > µ ≥ 1
2
, which is also consistent with BOP
on P.
These findings are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 5. If µ ≥ 1
2
, the P-equilibrium always exists, and
• c1 < c: no litigants consult an expert in the P-equilibrium
• c ∈ (c2, c1]: only P consults an expert in the P-equilibrium
• c ≤ c2: both litigants consult an expert in the P-equilibrium
Letting c¯ ≡ c1 and c ≡ c2 proves the first part of Proposition 1.
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Prior in favor of P
Now assume µ < 1
2
. If c > c1, P and D do not consult an expert for evidence, and therefore
they present nothing to J. In equilibrium, J correctly anticipates the litigants’ behavior, and
this implies that µ(φ, φ) = µ < 1
2
. Thus, BOP cannot fall on P in this case, and therefore
there is no P-equilibrium.
If c ≤ c1, P consults an expert but D does not. Thus, under the no-evidence event, J’s
belief is updated upward, i.e., µ(φ, φ) > µ. If the P-equilibrium is to exist, this updating
must be enough so that µ(φ, φ) becomes larger than 1
2
in spite of µ < 1
2
. This is possible if µ
is large (i.e., close to 1
2
) or e is large (i.e., close to 1). Note that µ(φ, φ) in this case is given
by (1), which can be easily verified to be increasing in µ and e. Because I have µ(φ, φ) > 1
2
under µ = 1
2
, by continuity, I also have µ(φ, φ) > 1
2
when µ is sufficiently close to 1
2
. Also, it
is straightforward to obtain µ(φ, φ) > 1
2
from (1) under e = 1. Thus, again by continuity, I
have µ(φ, φ) > 1
2
for sufficiently large e.
These findings are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 6. If µ < 1
2
,
• c1 < c: the P-equilibrium does not exist
• c ≤ c1: the P-equilibrium, in which only P consults an expert, exists if µ is close to 12
or e is close to 1
Letting c¯ ≡ c1 proves the second part of Proposition 1.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
J consults one expert rather than none if pi1J ≥ pi0J , or equivalently, if the cost is less than the
net benefit of consulting an expert:
c ≤ c¯J = e(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)µ− µ
= e(p− µ)
> 0.
Similarly, if the cost is such that
c ≤ cJ = e2(µp2 + 2p(1− p)µ+ (1− µ)p2) + 2e(1− e)(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)2µ
−[e(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)µ]
= (1− e) · e(p− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)>0
+ e · ep(1− p)(2µ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)≥0 ∵µ≥ 1
2
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> 0
then J consults two experts rather than only one.
Lastly, if the cost is such that
c ≤ 1
2
{e2(µp2 + 2p(1− p)µ+ (1− µ)p2) + 2e(1− e)(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)2µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− µ︸︷︷︸
(2)
}
=
1
2
{e2(µp2 + 2p(1− p)µ+ (1− µ)p2) + 2e(1− e)(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)2µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− [e(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)µ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
+ [e(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)µ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
− µ︸︷︷︸
(2)
}
=
1
2
 cJ︸︷︷︸
=(1)−(3)
+ c¯J︸︷︷︸
=(3)−(2)

> 0
then J consults two experts rather than none.
Rearranging cJ and c¯J , I obtain
cJ < c¯J ⇐⇒ µ <
2p− p2
1 + 2p(1− p) ≡ µ
where it is straightforward to show µ¯ ∈ (1
2
, p).
First, consider the case of cJ ≥ c¯J . If c > c¯J , no expert is better than 1 expert for J. If
c ≤ c¯J , 1 expert is better than no expert, and 2 experts are better than 1 expert because
c ≤ c¯J ≤ cJ . Thus, J never consults only one expert in this case, and therefore the only
issue for J is whether to consult two experts or none. Hence, J consults two experts when
c ≤ 1
2
(cJ + c¯J) and she consults no expert otherwise, which proves the second part of the
proposition. The first part can also be proved similarly.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us compare the no-expert threshold from the P-equilibrium in DI and the thresholds
from CI. Consider µ ≥ 1
2
. Comparing c¯ and c¯J , I obtain
c¯ = c1 = e((1− µ)p+ µ(1− p)) > e((1− µ)p− µ(1− p)) = e(p− µ) = c¯J .
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Subtracting cJ from c¯, I obtain
c¯− cJ = c1 − cJ
= e(µ(1− p) + (1− µ)p)− {(1− e)e(p− µ) + e2p(1− p)(2µ− 1)}
= e(µ+ p− 2µp− e(p2 + 2µp(1− p)− p)− (1− e)(p− µ))
= e(2µ(1− p)(1− ep)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+e(p− p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ p− µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
))
> 0
Next, consider µ < 1
2
. In this case, c¯J and cJ are given by
c¯J = e(µp− (1− µ)(1− p))
cJ = e
2(µp2 + 2p(1− p)(1− µ) + (1− µ)p2) + 2e(1− e)(µp+ (1− µ)p)
+(1− e)2(1− µ)− e(µp+ (1− µ)p)− (1− e)(1− µ)
Subtracting c¯J from c¯, I obtain
c¯− c¯J = e((1− µ)p+ µ(1− p))− e(µp− (1− µ)(1− p))
= e((1− µ)p+ µ(1− p)− µp+ (1− µ)(1− p))
= e(1− 2µp)
> 0
where the last inequality holds because µ < 1
2
and p < 1.
Subtracting cJ from c¯, I obtain
c¯− cJ = e((1− µ)p+ µ(1− p))− {e2(µp2 + 2p(1− p)(1− µ) + (1− µ)p2)
+2e(1− e)(µp+ (1− µ)p) + (1− e)2(1− µ)− e(µp+ (1− µ)p)− (1− e)(1− µ)}
= e((1− e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(1− 2µp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ep2 (1− 2µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+eµ)
> 0
Thus, c¯ from the P-equilibrium in DI is higher than c¯J and cJ in CI. As the proof for the
D-equilibrium part is completely symmetric, this completes the proof.
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 5
First, assume µ ≥ 1
2
. In the P-equilibrium with two experts, the error can be calculated as
E2P = µP (P wins|h) + (1− µ)P (D wins|l)
= µe(1− p)(1− e+ e(1− p)) + (1− µ)(1− ep(1− e+ ep)).
If J consults two experts in CI, the error is given by
E2J = µP (P wins|h) + (1− µ)P (D wins|l)
= µ(e2(1− p)2 + 2e(1− e)(1− p)) + (1− µ)(1− e2p2 − 2e(1− e)p)
Then, subtracting E2J from E
2
P , I obtain
E2P − E2J = µe(1− p)(1− e+ e(1− p)) + (1− µ)(1− ep(1− e+ ep))
−[µ(e2(1− p)2 + 2e(1− e)(1− p)) + (1− µ)(1− e2p2 − 2e(1− e)p)]
= (p− µ)e(1− e)
> 0
where the last inequality follows because µ < p and e < 1. Since the proof for the D-
equilibrium part is symmetric, this completes the proof.
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